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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CHARLES S. GARLETT,

REPLY BRIEF

Petitioner/Appellant,
-vs-

Appellate Case No. 20010218-CA

JENNIFER T. GARLETT,
Respondent/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PETITIONER/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Petitioner") submits the following as his
responsive brief to the Brief of Appellee in the above matter:
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, which are the Decree of
Divorce and the Order Denying the Motion to Set Aside Decree or Motion for New Trial, is
vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules
3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(h).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
The matter below is a divorce proceeding, and the orders appealed from are the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and the ruling on Motion for
New Trial.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following are the issues presented in reply:
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A.

Does the Petitioner's failure to object to the trial court's Memorandum Decision
and its failure to object to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law bar Petitioner from having these issues reviewed on appeal?

B.

Did the Petitioner adequately preserve the question of the adequacy of findings
underlying the alimony award for appeal?

C.

Did the trial court err in attributing income to the Petitioner above the amount
reflected on his tax returns and as testified at trial?

D.

Should this Court of Appeals grant the Respondent attorney's fees on appeal?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. CASES. STATUTES AND RULES

There is no case law nor statutory authority believed by the Petitioner to be wholly
dispositive of the issues raised on appeal, however, in deference to the concerns raised by the
Respondent in her Reply Brief, the Petitioner has provided this Court with a Table of Contents
citing various statutory rules and cases and further will reference as needed in this Reply Brief
cases that are applicable.1
STANDARD OF APPEAL
Petitioner cites once again to Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999), where the
court stated that "in formulating alimony awards, the trial court has broad discretion, and its
decisions will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice." Further,

1

In the Appellees's Reply Brief, Appellee criticizes the Appellant for stating that there is
no case law or statutory authority believed by Petitioner to be wholly dispositive on issues
raised on appeal. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) requiring citation to and
quotation of "constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal." While it is
true that several cases, statutes, and rules are used by the Appellant in his Brief, the purpose
of Appellant's statement is to indicate to this Court that there is no one case, statute, or rule
which is wholly dispositive of the issues being appealed. Clearly, Petitioner intends to cite to
the applicable areas of case law and statutes as needed as is evidenced by the content of this
Reply Brief.
2

the Respondent has never stated that the Memorandum Decision drafted by the trial court and
the subsequent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce propounded
by Respondent's counsel based upon this Memorandum Decision did not reflect the court's
ruling. Moreover, it is the abusive discretion standard which the Petitioner objects to stating
simply that the court abuse its discretion in not providing adequately detailed and supported
findings for its decision.
The standard of plain error mentioned by the Respondent's counsel (in citing the case
of Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1990), in the context mentioned by Respondent,
there must have been some error in regard to the reasoning of the court or in the reduction to
writing. In this context, Respondent describes something much closer to a clearly erroneous
standard. Plain error would be something such as whether a person had been served with
process (see Cams v. Cams, 668 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1983)), or whether or not a party to a
divorce action is voluntarily underemployed for purposes of child support. See Hill v. Hill, 869
P.2d 963, 965 (Utah App. 1994). Furthermore, the case of Christensen v. Christensen, 628
P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1981) stands for the principle that detailed findings not only
significantly aid the appellate court in its review, but help the parties determine whether or not
an appeal is necessary. This is because the parties can clearly determine what the court
based its decision on and can adequately determine whether or not the court committed error
or whether the court went beyond the bounds of its discretion. Findings that are legally
insufficient, such as the findings in the case at bar, will allow the Appellant to have the decision
overturned without marshaling the evidence. This is because the act of trying to marshal
evidence where findings are legally insufficient is futile. Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d
1103, 1105 (Utah App. 1959), "we agree with Ms. Williamson that 'she need not engage in a
futile marshaling exercise [because she] can demonstrate the findings, as framed by the court,
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are legally insufficient,' citing Campbell v. Campbell. 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah App. 1995)."
See also, Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992); Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d
1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1989).
Further, the trial court is granted broad discretion on ruling on a motion for relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d
1114 (Utah App. 1989). See, generally Bovce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980), and Eqan
v. Egan. 560 P.2d 704 (Utah 1977).
In regard to motions for a new trial, a party must establish: (1) the existence of newly
discovered evidence which is material and competent; (2) if by due diligence the existence
could not have been discovered and produced before trial; and (3) that the evidence is merely
cumulative or incidental, but is substantial enough that it would be evidence of a reasonable
likelihood of a different result," the trial court should grant the motion. Hudema v. Carpenter,
989 P.2d 491, 502 (Utah App. 1999). Clearly, the trial court in making a summary ruling that
the motion was simply denied is insufficient, especially given that Petitioner had provided the
court with newly discovered evidence submitted in the form of DNA result testing which could
not have been provided at time of trial, the court's decision to deny this motion. Respondent
did not have detailed findings or information regarding the ruling to make a determination as to
whether or not the Court's decision to deny his motion for a new trial was, in fact, an abusive
discretion, clearly erroneous, or arbitrary and capricious. In short, once again, if the findings
are legally insufficient, then the Appellant need not bear the burden of marshaling the
evidence as it would simply be futile. The Respondent acknowledges that the motion in and of
itself preserves the issue for appeal, yet fails to state why the trial court's decision is wholly
lacking in any findings to support its decision. Further, the Brief of Appellee states as follows:
Mr. Garlett did not object to the trial court's Memorandum Decision entered on
July 10, 2000, which include the trial court's first analysis of the issue (R. 59-62).
4

Nor did Mr. Garlett raise any objection to the adequacy of the trial court's
analysis in his motion for a new trial, filed September 21, 2000, nor did he file an
objection to the trial court's findings and conclusions, which reflects the analysis
challenged on appeal, filed on February 21, 2001 (R. 122-124). But see Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (permitting parties to move the trial court within ten
days of the final judgment to amend findings of make additional findings,
permitting such a motion to be made in conjunction with the motion for a new
trial). Brief of Appellee, at Page 3.
The above analysis indicates that the Respondent feels that no issue can be preserved for
appeal unless the trial court's decision is initially objected to in writing to the trial court within
ten days, which would require every case that would come before this Court of Appeals be
objected to initially before the trial court prior to bringing the case before the Court of Appeals.
While this is implied by the Respondent, Respondent provides no support for this position in
case law or statute other than to indicate that the option exists to file an objection, but fails to
state where this is mandated by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Clearly, increase in costs of litigation time and efforts spent by a party would triple
by requiring all cases brought before the Court of Appeals to be objected to formally and in
writing prior to submitting the case to this court for appellate review.
Further, had Petitioner a clear idea as to what the lower court based its decision on in
both the Motion to Review and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce, the Petitioner could have objected in a clear and concise fashion and given the trial
court an opportunity to rule on the issue. However, it is this lack of legally sufficient findings
upon which Petitioner must gain insight before he can object to the trial court's ruling.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from final judgment and Decree of Divorce in the Seventh Judicial
District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah, and an appeal from Petitioner's Motion
for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief from Judgment, pursuant to Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 60(b), the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding. Judge Anderson entered,
5

among other things, an order regarding alimony, child support and property distribution, and
denied the Petitioner's Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief From
Judgment, citing as his primary reason that the Petitioner "has submitted no reply, nor any
affidavit supporting his assertion that the evidence is newly discovered." (See Ruling on
Motion for New Trial attached hereto as Exhibit UA" and incorporated herein). The Decree of
Divorce from which this appeal arises was entered on or about February 23, 2001. A Notice of
Appeal was timely filed on behalf of Petitioner on or about March 1, 2001,
Petitioner filed for divorce in the trial court. Responsive pleadings were filed and the
matter came on before the lower court for trial on June 27, 2000. The Court took the matter
under advisement and entered its Memorandum Decision on July 10, 2000 (a copy of which
has been previously submitted to this Court). The Petitioner then filed a Motion for New Trial
on September 25, 2000. The Respondent subsequently filed a Verified Response and
Objection to Motion for New Trial dated October 6, 2000. The Court subsequently ruled
thereon and entered its own order on October 26, 2000. It is from the Decree of Divorce
signed on February 23, 2001, and prior orders in the case that the Petitioner has brought his
appeal.
There are no motions pending in the trial court pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b), 52(b),
54(b), or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties to this action were husband and wife, having been married in 1983. There
are three minor children at issue here: Travis Charles Garlett, born January 28, 1987; Corie
Elizabeth Garlett, born August 15, 1990; and Taylor Hallie Garlett, born May 11, 1994. The
parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered on February 23, 2001. The trial court
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awarded the Respondent sole custody of the parties' minor children subject to the Petitioner's
reasonable visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 (Memorandum Decision, page 2).
At the time of trial, the evidence presented to the trial court indicated that the
Respondent did have a history of working various jobs. However, the Respondent had never
worked a full-time job. No evidence was presented that would indicate that Respondent had
any health problems that would have prevented her from working full-time, and the
Respondent had been working part-time due to her own choice. The seasonality of her
employment was taken into account, as well as Respondent's need to be home to care for the
children when they were not in school. (Memorandum Decision, page 4). The trial court found
that Petitioner's income, as reflected by his federal income tax returns from recent history,
indicated he earned an average of $30,000.00 annually. However, the trial court found that
Petitioner admitted to "fudging his income by $5,000.00 during at least two years from 1994 to
1998" and, based upon the testimony of Respondent, that the family spent "$50,000.00 to
$80,000.00" annually on personal expenses. The lower court found Petitioner was capable of
earning at least $50,000.00 annually for purposes of calculating child support and alimony.
(Memorandum Decision, pages 3 and 4). The trial court found, based upon the testimony and
the evidence presented before it, the Respondent had little ability to earn more than minimum
wage. (Memorandum Decision, page 3). This resulted in Respondent being imputed income
of $5.15 per hour, working only 30 hours per week. (Memorandum Decision, page 4).
The trial court made no clear findings as to the reasonable monthly living expenses for
the Respondent, nor did the trial court articulate any clear findings as to its basis for calculating
the original monthly living expenses for the Respondent and the minor children living with her.
The trial court also failed to state with specificity what it determined to be the Petitioner's
reasonable living expenses. Despite this lack of findings, however, the trial court somehow
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found the Respondent to be in need of $2,134.50 per month to cover the expenses for herself
and her minor children. (Memorandum Decision, page 4). Moreover, the trial court stated that
if the children can live on $2,134.50 per month, Petitioner can live on the remains of his
monthly income after he pays $1,650.00 per month in child support and alimony.
(Memorandum Decision, page 5). The trial court made this determination without giving any
indication as to how it arrived at its conclusion, nor what the court felt the Petitioner's minimal
reasonable living and business expenses were.
Additionally, the trial court made a ruling that the Respondent be awarded the parties'
marital home subject to a lien of one-half (!4) of the equity value of that home in favor of
Petitioner, to be paid to Petitioner as soon as the home was sold. The home was not to be
sold until the youngest child in issue attains the age of 18 years or until the Respondent and
the children move out of the house. (Memorandum Decision, pages 5 and 6).

The trial court

divided the majority of the parties' marital assets based upon what it believed to be an
equitable or an even distribution of the dollar values of those items. However, the trial court
divided many of the assets carte blanche indicating that they had very little value and that they
were personal items ". . . whose value is very dependent upon their meaning to each person
and the use each could make." (Memorandum Decision, page 6). The trial court found that
the Respondent should be awarded virtually all the home furnishings and the Petitioner be
awarded all the sporting goods, with the exception that the Respondent be awarded a
computer and leased Chevrolet Suburban. The other items of significant value were a 1995
boat and trailer with a net value of $4,000.00, a camp trailer with a net value of $6,500.00, and
a vacant lot with a net value of $18,000.00. The boat and the trailer with the camper were
awarded to Petitioner. The vacant lot was to be sold with the first $10,500.00 of the sale
proceeds, after payment of any debts and the sale costs, to be paid to Respondent. The
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balance would then be divided between the parties. (Memorandum Decision, pages 6 and 7).
In making this award the court held that most of the items of personal property and home
furnishings are of very little value, including many items of cabinetry and woodworking that
were handcrafted by Petitioner, which left the Petitioner with none of the home furnishings. It
awarded all the home furnishings to the Respondent from a marriage that lasted over 16
years.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The Petitioner's failure to object to the trial court's Memorandum Decision and the
Findings of Fact do not bar raising these issues upon appeal. Further, the Petitioner's
failure to object to the trial court's ruling on Petitioner's Motion for a New Trial and
Motion to Set Aside Judgment does not bar raising this issue on appeal.

2.

The Petitioner adequately preserves the question of reviewing the adequacy of the
findings of the trial court for an abusive discretion for appeal. Petitioner need only
show that the trial court did not follow the requisite standards in creating adequate
findings such that the parties can clearly follow the reasoning of its decision, and such
findings being wholly inadequate, the exercise of marshaling the evidence to support
the findings is futile and Appellant need not marshal. Furthermore, Petitioner need not
file a written objection with the lower court to every order of that court in order to raise
the issue on appeal. Clearly, the Petitioner preserved the issues by presenting his
case to the trial court in support of his position. The trial court's failure to adequately
disclose to the parties the basis for its ruling did not bar the Petitioner from questioning
it on appeal.

3.

The trial court erred in imputing income to the Petitioner in excess of his stated income
on his Financial Declaration and his tax returns and further abused its discretion by not
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properly stating the basis for arriving at the Petitioner's apparently imputed income of
$50,000.00 per year. Further, the trial court failed to fully explain for purposes of
determining alimony what the Petitioner's reasonable expenses were or whether or not
the $50,000.00 level of income is based upon gross or net income. The Petitioner can
only assume that the $50,000.00 figure is based upon gross income, as gross income
is used to determine child support. As such, the question becomes what was the
reasonable amount of expenses that the court considered for the Petitioner, what level
of taxes did they find agreeable to deduct from the income of Petitioner for purposes of
determining his ability to pay alimony. However, it is the heart of Petitioner's Appeal
that he must make the above assumptions rather than simply review a clearly written
and supported decision of the trial court.
The Respondent should not be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. This appeal is
clearly meritorious. As such, no fees should be granted. At worst, the Petitioner's
Appeal is not frivolous. Further, attorney's fees are awarded on appeal to the
prevailing party only if that party was awarded fees at the lower court. In the case at
bar, Respondent was not awarded any fees during time of trial, and should not be
awarded fees on appeal, even were she to prevail.
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to establish proper Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to give this court a basis for its decision, in regard to child support,
alimony and property distribution. As such, this court should remand these issues in
favor of the Respondent and make any such remand for re-hearing consisted with this
court's directive regarding specificity of findings.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.

PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND FINDINGS OF FACT, AND THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION TO
SET ASIDE JUDGMENT DOES NOT BAR RAISING THESE ISSUES
ON APPEAL
A.

No Waiver.

The Petitioner has not waived any right to request that the trial court's decision be
reviewed on appeal simply by failing to object to them in writing. Any objection on the record
would have been futile, as the case was determined by a Memorandum Decision and no incourt decision was made. Further, the Memorandum Decision that was submitted does not
necessitate, nor is there any rule in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, requiring Respondent to first object to the court's ruling, which he heard
for the first time by a Memorandum Decision, in writing, pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, in order to request that this court review the issue of correctness of decision
and for an abusive discretion on appeal. Further, the Respondent is incorrect in her Reply
Brief where she states, "On Appeal, he [the Petitioner] has made no claim of plain error, or
otherwise justified this court's consideration of this issue for the first time on appeal." Clearly,
the Respondent has confused the standard under which this appeal is being taken. The
standard under which this is being taken is an abusive discretion, not plain error. Were the
Petitioner to have sufficiently detailed findings, then the Petitioner might be able to raise an
issue of clear error. However, the findings being insufficient, that option has been foreclosed
to Petitioner. Examples of questions of discretion, which a party may appeal from abuse of
discretion, are as follows: whether or not a trial court had properly allocated marital debts for
which it has broad discretion (see Hill v. Hill. 859 P.2d 963, 966-967 (Utah App. 1994); whether
the trial court correctly determined the standard of living that existed during the parties'
11

marriage for purposes of calculating alimony (see Crompton v. Crompton. 888 P.2d 686, 689
(Utah App. 1994); and how to determine the level of income for child support and alimony
(see Griffith v. Griffith. 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999).
Examples of challenging the trial court's decision based upon the clearly erroneous
standard are as follows: Determining whether or not one spouse has waiver her right to reduce
alimony payments (see Hinckley v. Hinckley. 815 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Utah App. 1991); and
whether or not the trial court correctly applied the parties' incomes to the presumptive child
support worksheet to correctly calculate child support. The difference between a clearly
erroneous decision and a decision where there exists an abusive discretion is under the clearly
erroneous standard the Court of Appeals is reviewing the trial courts' decision to determine
whether or not it applied the facts of the case to the legal standards that are present. Under
an abusive discretion, the appellate court is reviewing the trial court's decision to see whether
or not the trial court went too far in its discretion away from the standards set or legally
prescribed to it. The distinction is subtle, yet critical. As this case is an abusive discretion
standard, we are determining whether or not the trial court applied and whether or not the trial
court even remotely considered the legal standards that are used in making its determination
in regard to imputation of income and calculation of alimony. We are not concerned, at this
point, whether or not the trial court made a decision that was against the clear weight of the
evidence, as we are not sure, based upon that court's decision, what evidence it even
considered in making its determination. Furthermore, as stated in the Williamson case, supra,
legally inadequate findings lower and even mitigate the appealing party's burden of marshaling
the evidence, Williamson. 983 P.2d at 1105.
An example of this abusive discretion is restated in the Respondent's Brief on Page 15
where Respondent states:
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Mr. Garlett's Exhibit 14, a Financial Declaration, listing his monthly net income at
$2,154.00, his total monthly expenses at $2,586.12, and his monthly payments
at $275.12, further demonstrates that the trial court acted well within its
discretion in choosing not to rely his [sic] discretion in choosing not to rely on Mr.
Garlett's assessment of his income. According to this document, Mr. Garlett
was spending $707.24 per month more than he was making, without any
provisions of his family-a position that is radically inconsistent with the Garlett
family lifestyle.
The trial court never explained, however, what expenses it considered appropriate for
Petitioner in determining his ability to pay alimony. The Respondent states at length that
evidence was put on by both parties to state that Petitioner's income could have been
anywhere from $50,000.00 to $80,000.00 per year (R. 146 at 164).
The trial court, in setting the Petitioner's expenses at $50,000.00 per year, is tacitly
stating that this would be his gross income as gross pre-tax income is what is used by a court
specifically in making a determination of child support. However, said child support being set
at $50,000.00 year for Petitioner does not include his reasonable deductions for purposes of
taxes and business expenses. The tax and business expense deductions are appropriate for
making a determination of what his alimony figure should be. However, the court does not
state what it is deducting for reasonable expenses for purposes of determining alimony, which
by all rights it should have considering that Petitioner is obviously going to have to pay taxes
on his court-ordered income of $50,000.00 per year, and he is also going to have to pay child
support in at least some amount as well as pay his reasonable living expenses on a monthly
basis. Instead, the trial court arrives at a round figure of $600.00 per month with no
explanation as to how Petitioner is expected to pay this amount. The trial court is apparently
aware of its duty to list expenses with at least a reasonable amount of specificity as it does in
H4 of its Memorandum Decision:
Jennifer is entitled to alimony. She will receive about $1,050.00 in child support.
She will earn about $600.00 in take-home pay. She has demonstrated a need
for $2,134.50 per month to cover expenses for herself and the children.
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Alimony will be taxable to her. The court will award $600.00 per month alimony
with the expectation that she will net $500.00 to cover her expenses. Chuck is
able to pay this amount. If Jennifer and the children can live on $2,134.50 per
month, Chuck can live on what remains as his monthly income after he pays
$1,650.00 in child support and alimony. (Memorandum Decision at 4 and 5).
(Emphasis added).
The trial court fails, however, to establish what Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses are.
In fact, calculating that Petitioner will need at least similar amounts of money to live on every
month, given that the purpose of alimony in a long-term marriage is to equalize the parties'
standard of living, it is reasonable to assume that the Respondent will need at least $2,134.50
per month to live on identical to the Petitioner. Given that the court has determined that
Petitioner will have $4,166.00 per month pre-tax income with which to pay his expenses, it is
reasonable to assume that he will be paying taxes on that which will amount to at least twentysix percent (26%) of that income, which leaves Petitioner $3,083.00 per month to live on.
Subtracting from this amount the $1,650.00 in combined child support and alimony, Petitioner
is left with $1,433.00 per month to live on, an amount far lower than the $2,134.50 that
Respondent apparently needs to live on.
The above analysis would be the basis for an appeal based upon a decision as clearly
erroneous (where the law applied to the clear weight of the evidence does not warrant the
decision arrived at by the trial court). However, the above argument is wholly speculative on
the part of the Petitioner because the trial court failed to go through a similar analysis as above
stated toward the Petitioner. Clearly, the trial court was aware of its ability, and at least
partially aware, of its duty to perform this analysis, as it did so for the Respondent. Yet,
somehow, the need for similar reasoning was lost as it applied to Petitioner. For that reason
alone, the trial court's decision should be remanded for further findings consistent with the
directives of the Court of Appeals. Once again, in citing Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877,
881 (Utah App. 1995), "the trial court is required to enter detailed and specific findings on all
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material issues," and in citing Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah App. 1993),u. . . in
determining whether to impute income due to other employment, the findings must address the
clerical question of whether a drop in earnings was voluntary."
Without belaboring a point, Petitioner feels it is necessary to emphasize the standards
that this court has set forth in making alimony awards. "We uphold that the omission of a
particular finding in alimony awards is an abusive discretion," Bird v. Bird, 799 P.2d 1167,
1170 (Utah App. 1990), citing Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah App. 1982).
"Further, the trial court is required to enter sufficient findings on the enumerated Jones factors,
and we will reverse if it fails to do so unless the relevant facts contained within the record are
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of judgment."
Breinholt. 905 P.2d at 880 (citing Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah App. 1991).
Similar to Breinholt. both parties testified and submitted documentation for court regarding their
stated monthly expenses. However, the trial court, in this case as in Breinholt. did not enter
findings in regard to the reasonableness of the parties' expenses. While the trial court did
state that $2,134.50 was a reasonable amount of expenses for Respondent, the trial court did
not give any reasonable expenses which should be attributable to the Petitioner. As such,
similar to Breinholt. the appellate court should remand so that we can determine if the court
abused its discretion concerning the amount of the alimony award. The Respondent replies in
her Brief, that "the business expenses of Mr. Garlett were not 'highly contested,' as were those
in Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 892 (Utah App. 1995), relied on at Page 12 in the
opening Brief of Appellant. Rather, in the instant case, Mr. Garlett complains of the trial court's
failure to make findings out of thin air-something no trial court is required to do." (Brief of
Appellee, at Page 19). Respondent is clearly mistaken in this regard, as Petitioner is not
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asking for the court to make findings of out thin air. Indeed, the Respondent submitted
numerous bank statements and testified at great length at trial in regard to income.
Additionally, both parties submitted proposed financial declarations and tax returns to
the court at trial, which the trial court had in order to make a determination in regard to the
parties' reasonable monthly expenses. The Respondent goes to great length to discuss the
numerous trips taken by Respondent to Wyoming, Montana, Oregon, Las Vegas, Phoenix,
Denver, New Mexico, and Cancun, and further to discuss the fact that Petitioner has had "six
or seven guns worth around $1,500.00 and fishing tackle worth about $4,500.00 and took his
bass fishing boat to Lake Powell." (See Brief of Appellee, at Page 18, and R.146 at 97-99 and
R.146 at 73 and 74, 93).
Given that the trial court held over its ruling to write a Memorandum Decision, one can
only assume that the trial court had adequate time to consider the evidence that was before it.
Given that it had taken the extra time to make the ruling via a Memorandum Decision instead
of making a ruling from the bench that day, one can only assume that given the evidence
before it, the trial court had adequate time to divine from the evidence what the parties'
reasonable standards and monthly living expenses were. This is hardly consistent with the
Appellee's claim that the trial court was being required to make expenses "out of thin air."
The trial court's failure to do so can only be construed as an abuse of discretion for
which this court should remand that the trial court enter more detailed findings in this regard
and should hear, once again, the evidence provided by both parties in order to make an
adequate determination of the parties' reasonable standards of living, monthly expenses, and
other income-related issues.
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POINT 2.

PETITIONER ADEQUATELY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL THE ISSUES
THAT IT WOULD HAVE THIS COURT REVIEW IN REGARD TO THE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.

The Brief of Appellee states on Page 3, that "Are the findings underlying the alimony
adequate? This case is governed by the differential abuse of discretion standard of review. . .
. and further, it goes on to state because Mr. Garlett did not notify the trial court of the error
claimed on appeal, despite having ample opportunity to do so, the issue is now preserved but
for appeal." See, e.g., Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App. 1990). Once again, the
Respondent is confusing the clearly erroneous standard with the abuse of discretion standard.
While the above-cited case states it stands for an abuse of discretion standard, the context in
which Respondent would use said decision is more akin to a clearly erroneous standard. The
Petitioner can only complain of the clearly erroneous decision of the trial court when he has
the information necessary to make that complaint. The trial court, having failed to provide
detailed and sufficient findings to support it legal conclusions, has left the Petitioner at a
disadvantage in that regard. The Petitioner can only point out to the Court of Appeals that the
findings are lacking in the support of the legal conclusions reached and request the trial court
remand for review the decision of the trial court.
Further, to state that the issue is not preserved for appeal because he failed to object
to the clearly erroneous decision of the trial court would be to require the Petitioner to (1)
assume the basis wholly on his own without any direction from the trial court upon which the
trial court based its decision, and (2) then file an objection to the trial court within ten days of
receiving its decision based upon findings which the Petitioner has had to himself at least
partially create in order to file the objection itself. In this regard, preservation for appeal means
that the Respondent brought all the relevant information before the trial court and the trial court
failed to give detailed and sufficient findings in support of its decision based upon that
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information. The Petitioner and Respondent gave to the trial court their financial declarations,
tax returns and bank statements, and testimony regarding their income. The least that the trial
court could have done was given adequate support for its finding that Petitioner has
$50,000.00 a year income, list the expenses that the court considered persuasive in arriving at
that income, and give an adequate basis for determining the Petitioner's standard of living so it
could determined the Petitioner's ability to pay alimony to the Respondent.
In Doe v. Hafen. the Respondent was requesting that the court overturn the decision of
the trial court judge based upon, at least in part, the trial court judge's failure to ask a question
in jury instructions to a jury which was in the judge's discretion to not ask. "Plaintiff did include
one question in the series that may have, by itself, been proper. However, after the judge
reviewed the whole series, Plaintiff made no attempt to call the judge's attention to that specific
question. The party must make 'known to the court the action which he desires . . . or his
objection to the action of the court and grounds therefore . . ." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 46. This means to preserve a question for appeal, an objection must be clearly and
concisely made in a "fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon." \d. at 458. It is misapplied
to the case at bar, as this decision was given via Memorandum and no opportunity was given
to Petitioner to make the objection on the record.
Clearly, the Petitioner should not be barred from appealing the decision of the judge for
failure to object to the judge's decision regarding alimony when the Petitioner cannot define
from the judge's own ruling the basis for the decision in making this award of alimony in the
first place. In short, the Respondent is once again trying to penalize the Petitioner for failure to
make an objection based upon a clear and erroneous standard when the abusive discretion
here involves failure to submit sufficient and detailed findings to support the legal conclusions
of the trial court.
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POINT 3.

THE TRIAL DID ERR IN ATTRIBUTING TO THE PETITIONER INCOME
IN EXCESS OF THAT FOUND IN HIS TAX RETURNS FOR PURPOSES
OF CALCULATION OF HIS CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.

Respondent in her Brief of Appellee, goes to great length again to cite the Doe v.
Hafen to argue that Petitioner has not preserved these issues for appeal Petitioner will not
restate the arguments made above in controverting the position of the Respondent in that
regard. Merely, for this court to the same arguments as have been previously stated in
response to those allegations. In response to the allegations contained in the Brief of
Appellee, on Page 31, wherein Appellee states:
In point 3 of his Brief, Mr. Garlett asserts that his income should be assessed at
$3,000.00 a month, because Mrs. Garlett testified that at times he can be very
frugal, and may have lived on $18,000.00 in the first six months of the year.

Assuming that Mr. Garlett spent $18,000.00 in six months does not account for
a Seventeen Thousand Dollar loan the Knuths provided in that same time
period, the home he was building for the Knuths without compensation, with the
exception that he would later purchase the home from them at a very low cost,
or reoay his labor if he could not buy the home, or otherwise refute the evidence
concerning his earning history and capacity, and the wealthy lifestyle enjoyed by
the Garlett family, discussed above, supra.
The Brief of Appellee fails to point out that the money loaned to Petitioner by the
Knuths was just that-a loan, for which the Knuths expect repayment and which Petitioner is
obligated to repay. A loan should not be calculated as income, otherwise all parties who have
credit cards should have their expenses on the credit cards counted as income for purposes of
determining annual income. The fact that the trial court had this information before it and
failed to factor it into their calculation of Petitioner's income further shows the lack of specificity
in the court's findings. It goes to show the lack of attention that the trial court paid to
establishing Respondent's reasonable monthly expenses, when he had, in fact, information not
only regarding money that Petitioner earned but money that he borrowed in order to pay for his
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monthly expenses. Further, the trial court fails to articulate in its decision what portion of those
expenses is attributable to the home that Petitioner was building and what portion of those
expenses was attributable to personal expenditures of the Petitioner. Further, on Page 32 of
the Brief of Appellee, Appellee states:
He [Petitioner] submitted Exhibit 14, financial declaration, listing his monthly net
income at $2,154.00 and listing total monthly expenses at $2,586.12 and
monthly payments at $275.12. According to this document, Mr. Garlett was
spending $707.24 per month more than he was making without any provisions
for his family-a position that is radically inconsistent with the Garlett family
lifestyle.
By her own statement, Respondent acknowledges impliedly that the trial court failed to
adequate address Petitioner's lifestyle. This inconsistency, while not unusual for families going
through divorces, has been only addressed by the Respondent in the Brief of Appellee and
nowhere in the Record of Trial and nowhere in the Memorandum Decision of the trial court
judge. Respondent's own analysis in her own appellate brief sheds more light on the
expenses that the court may have considered by the Respondent than does the trial court.
The entire paragraph quoted above is pure speculation on the part of the Respondent. The
Respondent assumes that the trial court follows the above reasoning to figure out what
Petitioner's income is, however, the trial court nowhere in any of its written documentation nor
oral statements on the record indicates that this is the case.

Once again, Respondent is

engaging in the kind of speculation that requires this court remand for further review the
decision of the trial court.
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POINT 4.

RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED ATTORNEY'S FEES
FOR RESPONDENT TO PETITIONER'S APPEAL, AS PETITIONER'S
APPEAL HAS MERIT, PRESENTS LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS
REGARDING SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS AND IS NOT SOUGHT
FRIVOLOUSLY.

This court should not award attorney's fees to Respondent upon appeal. "Ordinarily,
with fees in a divorce that have been awarded to a party who then prevails on appeal, fees will
also be awarded to that party on appeal." Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah App. 1992)
(quoting Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1167,
1171 (Utah App. 1990)). See also. Munz v. Munz. 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah App. 1990) (citing
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App. 1998).
Respondent was not awarded fees in the case at bar in the lower court and should not
be awarded fees on appeal, even if she prevails. Further, the Petitioner has met his burden of
showing serious deficiencies in the ruling of the trial court and, thus, no frivolity is involved in
his appeal. There are serious issues that the court needs to address and the misstatements of
Respondent in her Brief, such as that "Mr. Garlett not only misidentifies the gender of the child
whose family identity is in jeopardy, but also claims that his belated efforts to challenge the
paternity of the child are justified by the need to test the 'natural father,' when no such tests
were performed or required, or by trial counsel, in regards to his failure to follow through with
non-existent plan to bastardize this child," are in no way true. The misidentification of the
gender of the child is nothing but a clerical error and should in no way be used to demonstrate
that Petitioner is in any way trying to request this court order the trial court to do anything but
follow the law as stated before and as cited in the Brief of Appellant. The error in that regard is
harmless and does substantively affect the analysis of any issues presented on appeal.
Furthermore, the attempts on the part of Respondent to imply that Petitioner's attorney and the
Petitioner himself should be sanctioned for appealing the decision of what can be called at
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best a cursory analysis by the trial court, is itself merely inflammatory behavior with which the
Respondent is seeking favor in the eyes of this Court and potentially fees with which to pay for
her litigation, and is not meritorious in the case at bar. The Respondent states that Petitioner's
Appeal is legally frivolous and filed for purposes of delay. (See Brief of Appellee, Page 37).
Given that Petitioner is now paying both his child support and alimony obligations regularly and
that the Respondent is enjoying possession of the home and custody of all the parties' minor
children, and receiving financial support for those children, it is hardly meritorious to say that
the Petitioner's Appeal of the lower court's decision is delaying any relief that is currently being
enjoyed by Respondent.
CONCLUSION
The court should remand the trial court's ruling for further findings in regard to the
above-stated issues and should deny the Respondent's Rule 33 request for an award of
attorney's fees.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon & Williams, and that
mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing to:
HAPPY MORGAN
Attorney for Respondent
8 South 100 East
Moab, Utah 84532
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Secretary

23

EXHIBIT "A"
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES S. GARLETT
Plaintiff,
vs

RULING ON MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

JENNIFER T. GARLETT
Defendant,

Case No. 9947-167
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Petitioner Charles S. Garlett ("Charles") has moved for a
new trial, asserting the discovery of evidence that he is not the
father of one of the children.
affidavit.

That motion is supported by no

Respondent Jennifer T. Garlett ("Jennifer") has

submitted a verified response asserting that Charles was well
aware of the possibility - or even probability - that he was not
the father of one of the children.

Charles has submitted no

reply, nor any affidavit supporting his assertion that the
evidence is newly discovered.

The motion for new trial is denied.

Because the motion

has so little merit, the court exercises its discretion in
domestic relations cases to award Jennifer her fees in responding
to the motion.

Counsel for Jennifer should submit an affidavit

with her proposed order pursuant to Rule 4-504.
Dated this _ w^~ • day of October, -2000. .
Lyle R. Anderson, District Judge

1

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 994700167 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

By Hand
D a t e d t h i s £'$

Siay of

ft

NAME
MARY C. CORPORON
ATTORNEY
808 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
Suite 1400
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
HAPPY MORGAN

CTOVT-? V~ / 2 0of>

Deputy C o u r t

Page 1

(last)

.

ClerJ

